Passkey basics · Recovery & devices

Synced vs. device-bound passkeys: the difference and how to tell them apart

6 min read

Key points

  • Synced passkeys are copied across a person's devices by their passkey provider, while device-bound passkeys (such as security keys) never leave one authenticator.
  • Your server can tell them apart from the BE (backup eligible) and BS (backed up) flags in the authenticator data.
  • Accept synced passkeys for general users, and make sure people with only device-bound passkeys have a second passkey or a recovery path.

A synced passkey is copied, encrypted, across a person's devices by their passkey provider, such as iCloud Keychain or Google Password Manager. A device-bound passkey stays on a single authenticator, such as a hardware security key. Your server can tell which is which from the BE and BS flags in the authenticator data it receives at registration and sign-in. For general users, accept synced passkeys, and for people who only have a device-bound passkey, prompt them to add a second one or make sure they have a recovery path.

Two kinds of passkeys

The FIDO Alliance calls passkeys that sync between a user's devices "synced passkeys" and those that never leave one device "device-bound passkeys."

Synced passkey Device-bound passkey
Where the private key lives Encrypted and copied across devices by the provider Inside one authenticator only
If a device is lost Still usable on other devices or a new device with the same provider That key is gone
Typical example iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager Hardware security key
Good fit for Consumer sign-in Administrators, high-assurance work

Both use the same WebAuthn mechanism and both resist phishing. The signature is bound to the origin and RP ID the browser checked, so it can't be used on a fake site. What differs is where the key lives and what happens when a device goes missing.

How synced passkeys are protected

Syncing doesn't mean private keys sit in the cloud in plain text. Here is how the providers describe it:

  • Apple: passkeys sync across a person's devices with iCloud Keychain, which is end-to-end encrypted with keys Apple doesn't know. If someone loses all their devices, passkeys can be recovered through iCloud Keychain escrow
  • Google: passkeys in Google Password Manager are end-to-end encrypted, and using them on a new device requires the Google Password Manager PIN or the screen lock of an Android device

So the security of a synced passkey also depends on how well the provider account (Apple Account or Google Account) is protected. From your side, if someone takes over a user's provider account, they may be able to use that user's passkeys too.

How NIST treats them

NIST SP 800-63B-4 (August 2025) covers syncable authenticators in Appendix B:

  • Syncable authenticators may be offered as an option for applications up to AAL2
  • Because their private keys are exportable, syncable authenticators must not be used at AAL3
  • AAL3 requires a phishing-resistant authenticator with a non-exportable private key

Consumer sites and online stores rarely need AAL3. Internal admin consoles, or work where regulation or contracts call for AAL3-level assurance, are where requiring device-bound passkeys makes sense.

Telling them apart on the server: BE and BS

W3C WebAuthn Level 3 defines two bits in the authenticator data flags:

  • BE (Backup Eligibility): whether the authenticator that created the key allows it to be backed up (synced). Set at creation and never changes
  • BS (Backup State): whether the key is currently backed up. Can change over time
BE BS Meaning
0 0 Single-device credential
0 1 Not allowed by the spec
1 0 Multi-device credential, not currently backed up
1 1 Multi-device credential, currently backed up

The spec recommends storing the latest flag values with the account and gives examples of how to use them:

  • BE is 0: the key is lost if the device is lost. Make sure the account has additional authenticators or an account recovery process
  • BS changes from 0 to 1: the key is now backed up and survives the loss of one device. This can be a moment to suggest removing the password
  • BS changes from 1 to 0: the key is no longer backed up (the user turned off backup, or the backup service had a problem). Guide the user through checking their other factors

BE and BS are reported by the authenticator itself. If you need to know what kind of authenticator someone used, that's what attestation and AAGUIDs are for, covered in Attestation and AAGUIDs.

Which to accept

General users

Accept synced passkeys. People don't have to recreate passkeys every time they change phones, and fewer of them end up locked out after losing a device. There's no reason to reject device-bound passkeys from people who use security keys either.

People with only device-bound passkeys

If someone has only registered keys with BE set to 0, encourage them to add a second passkey: another security key or a synced passkey on their phone. As the spec points out, one single-device key does not survive the loss of that device.

Administrators and high-assurance work

You may decide to require device-bound passkeys. In that case, your service checks BE after registration and, if the key is syncable, removes it and explains why. Because BE is self-reported, strictly limiting which authenticators are allowed also requires attestation.

What to show on a passkey management page

Showing each key's status on the user's passkey management page helps people protect themselves:

  • The key's name (from registration, or the provider name derived from the AAGUID)
  • Whether it's synced (BE and BS)
  • When it was last used
  • A remove button

A note shown only on keys with BE set to 0, such as "This passkey isn't synced. If you lose this device you won't be able to sign in, so add another passkey," works well.

Implementing this with SealGate

SealGate's device list (GET /v1/users/{external_id}/credentials) returns backup_eligible, backed_up, aaguid, transports and last_used_at for each passkey. You can use them to show "synced" on your management page or to prompt people whose passkeys all have backup_eligible: false to add another. To add a passkey for a signed-in user, call /v1/register/options with signed_in: true. See the docs for details.

FAQ

Are synced passkeys less secure?

They resist phishing just like device-bound passkeys. The difference is that the private key is exportable, and NIST accepts them up to AAL2. Use device-bound passkeys where AAL3 is required.

If someone switches from an iPhone to Android, do their synced passkeys move?

Not automatically. iCloud Keychain and Google Password Manager are different providers. People either create new passkeys on the new device or use a password manager that supports moving passkeys between providers. See Helping users who lost or replaced their device.

Can the BE flag be faked?

BE and BS are reported by the authenticator. If you need to verify the type of authenticator, use attestation.

Sources

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